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1 Introduction 
 
The advent of microfinance programs a few decades ago was believed to be a major 
step towards helping the poor gain agency over their own financial lives by both 
improving their livelihood potential as well as their ability to smooth consumption. 
In theory, microfinance can help the poor invest in income-generating activities as 
well as cope more effectively with periods of illness, accidents, or natural disasters. 
Through one or both of these channels, microfinance may improve many of the 
aspects of poverty that development practitioners care about, such as household 
income and asset levels, health and nutrition, and education. 
 
Empirically, however, whether and how microfinance loans have facilitated 
consumption smoothing and helped the poor maintain gainful employment remains 
debated. Recent experimental evidence indicates that traditional microfinance loans 
have limited impact on the average borrower (Banerjee et al., 2009; Karlan and 
Zinman, 2009). On the other hand, the results of several quasi-experimental studies 
have suggested that access to microfinance can improve client welfare (Pitt and 
Khandker 1998 and Morduch 1998). In addition, some of the features of 
microfinance that are traditionally emphasized, such as group liability, may be less 
important in reducing default than originally presumed (Gine and Karlan, 2006). 
Furthermore, media reports that over-indebtedness to microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) was causing mental distress among the poor in the Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh have spurred the government to increase oversight and regulation of the 
MFI sector (Shylendra 2006).  
 
These events and findings suggest a greater need to gather rigorous empirical 
evidence to better understand and test the underlying mechanisms of microfinance 
loans in delivering benefits to the poor. It also suggests a need to evaluate potential 
innovations to contract design that may further improve outcomes. 
 
This paper focuses on a key aspect of microfinance contracts- repayment schedules- 
to determine the impact of greater flexibility in repayment schedules on clients’ 
ability to smooth consumption as well as increase income by putting their loans in 
                                                        
1 The authors of this paper can be contacted at efield@latte.harvard.edu and 
rohini_pande@harvard.edu. We are grateful to the US Department of Labor for funding this paper. 
We also thank ICICI Foundation and Exxon-Mobil for funding. We thank Emmerich Davies, Sitaram 
Mukherjee and Anup Roy for superb field work and the Village Financial Services and Center for 
MicroFinance for hosting this study. Any errors are our own. 
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less liquid but higher return investments. Traditionally, microfinance repayment 
schedules are notoriously rigid, involving high frequency repayment in small 
installments beginning soon after loan disbursement, an important aspect of the 
lending model pioneered by earliest MFIs such as the Grameen Bank (Armendariz 
and Morduch 2005). However, in theory, clients are likely to be better off under 
more flexible repayment terms, which would give them greater ability to smooth 
consumption in the face of unanticipated shocks and encourage them to invest more 
of the loan in relatively illiquid but potentially higher return business investments 
(Field and Pande 2008). Through both of these channels, introducing flexibility in 
the timing of repayment by reducing repayment frequency could increase client 
long-run business income.  
 
We study the impact of increased flexibility in repayment schedules through a field 
experiment with a large MFI in Kolkata, India, in which we collect daily consumption 
data for 200 clients over 50 days by an innovative use of cell phone technology. 
Clients in the control group receive a loan with a repayment schedule that is 
standard in microfinance, which involves initiating repayment one week after loan 
disbursement and thereafter repaying in weekly installments. Meanwhile, clients 
who were randomly assigned to receive the treatment initiated repayment five 
weeks after loan disbursement and repaid every five weeks. 2 We examine the 
impact of this difference in debt structure by collecting detailed information about 
household income, expenditures, and business activities on a daily basis from both 
the microfinance client and her husband. 
 
This paper shares much of the theoretical framework with its companion study 
authored by Field, Pande, Papp and Rigol (2011). Although the companion paper 
introduces repayment flexibility in the form of a two-month grace period prior to 
initiation of loan repayments (with both control and treatment groups repaying 
every two weeks once repayment started), the implications of the theoretical model 
are similar. In this study, by comparing clients who are repaying on a weekly basis 
and those who are repaying every five weeks, we introduce two potential sources of 
impact- the grace-period and the repayment frequency. Since treatment clients in 
this study do not commence repayment until five weeks after disbursement versus 
control clients who start one week after disbursement, one potential source for 
impact is the difference in grace period.  Secondly, the difference in repayment 
frequency after the first loan payment is also a potential source of impact. 
Lengthening the time horizon until the next loan repayment should make relatively 
illiquid investments more viable. In turn, this should increase the average return on 
investments and therefore business profits and household income. In addition, the 
longer time horizon should allow for households to smooth consumption over 
expenditure and income shocks better than under the standard repayment 
schedule. Predictions about the impact of repayment flexibility on default are more 
                                                        
2 A small fraction of the treatment group was assigned to a 4-week repayment schedule as opposed 
to a five-week repayment schedule. The change to a five-week repayment schedule was made to 
better accommodate our MFI partner’s logistical needs. 
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ambiguous and depend on the relationship between illiquidity, mean return, and 
variability of return of the investments available.  
 
Our field experiment provides rigorous evidence that repayment flexibility 
increased both the level and variability of business income, investment in business 
inventory, and household expenditures. It also decreased mental stress about 
financial issues for clients, and both the level and variability of hours worked by 
household members other than the client and her husband. In contrast to the results 
of the companion paper, we do not see causal impact of a more flexible repayment 
schedule on default. The fact that we do not see default results here while we see 
significant increase in default in the companion paper may be due to either 
differences in the nature of the two samples or a direct effect of repayment 
frequency, which we discuss in more detail in section 8.5.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that shows how moving from a 
weekly to monthly repayment schedule impacts income levels and the ability of 
households to smooth consumption over time. The ideas we test in our paper is 
related to the literature that tests whether the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 
holds among poor households. However, our paper has more direct implications for 
policy since microfinance repayment contracts are set by NGOs or governments as 
opposed to “natural” shocks such as rainfall, catastrophic events, and illness that are 
typically used by development economists as a source of exogenous shock. 
 
The paper is set out as follows. The next section reviews the literature relevant to 
consumption smoothing and microfinance, section 3 highlights some of the 
challenges to measuring consumption and steps we have taken to address those 
concerns, section 4 describes our MFI partner, section 5 explains our experimental 
design, and section 6 outlines our theoretical predictions. The next two sections 
describe our empirical strategy and our results. The last section concludes with 
policy implications. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
The ability of poor households to smooth consumption in settings where incomes 
are low but variable has been the subject of a large literature in Economics. Large 
fluctuations in consumption of food and other basic necessities may have negative 
impacts not only in the short run but on a variety of long-run outcomes such as 
health, education attainment, and earnings potential. The concept of consumption 
smoothing is closely related to shocks, income variability and access to financial 
instruments (credit and savings) and by necessity our review of the relevant 
literature delves into these related topics. We have organized our literature review 
into three sections, working our way from a broader review of the theory and 
empirical evidence on the relationship between consumption smoothing and shocks 
(section 2.1), to a discussion about the relationship between microfinance and 
consumption smoothing (section 2.2) and finally, to an overview of the burgeoning 
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theoretical and empirical work on how repayment schedules of microfinance loans 
can affect consumption smoothing of microfinance clients (section 2.3). 
 
2.1 Consumption smoothing and shocks  
 
The idea of consumption smoothing is based on the assumption that individuals 
have relatively stable preferences over time and therefore prefer to maintain 
consistent levels of consumption if they can. It is closely linked to the permanent 
income hypothesis first formulated by Milton Friedman (1957) which posited that 
individuals do not make their consumption choices based on their current income 
but by their expectations of future long-term income. In this model, consumers 
classify income as “permanent” or “transitory” and individuals make their 
consumption decisions as a stable proportion of their permanent income. Most 
importantly, because agents are assumed to have access to both credit and savings 
markets, the permanent income theory predicts that transitory, short-term changes 
in income have little impact on consumption patterns when markets are complete. 
In other words, although empirical evidence shows that income in developing 
countries may be highly variable and subject to shocks (for example, see Townsend 
1995), the permanent income hypothesis predicts that consumption levels should 
be stable.  
 
As a result, one way to explore the relevance of the permanent income hypothesis in 
a particular setting is to estimate changes in consumption (if any) in response to 
shocks. The empirical literature testing the permanent income hypothesis in this 
manner has produced conflicting results that vary across time and space. On one 
hand, a number of studies in the context of Asian developing countries fail to reject 
the hypothesis that individuals are largely able to smooth consumption in the event 
of shocks. For example, Townsend (1994) looks at household-level consumption in 
three Indian villages and finds no evidence that year-to-year household 
consumption is influenced by idiosyncratic shocks (sickness, unemployment) once 
one controls for village-level consumption in the analysis. Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1998) use variations in rainfall as an exogenous shock on household income in a 
rural area of India, and find no evidence against the hypothesis that households are 
able to smooth consumption over year-to-year fluctuations in income. Paxson 
(1993) compares households in Thailand with different seasonal income patterns 
and estimates the responsiveness of seasonal consumption to seasonal income. 
Finding that households with different seasonal income patterns also have different 
consumption patterns that track income would provide evidence against the 
permanent income hypothesis. However, Paxson finds that households with 
different seasonal income patterns actually have similar consumption patterns over 
the year, suggesting that seasonal variation in consumption are due to seasonal 
variation in preferences or prices rather than variation in income. Chaudhuri and 
Paxson (2001) employ a similar strategy in three Indian villages and also reject that 
consumption patterns track seasonal variation in income.  
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However, other studies find empirical evidence suggesting that the ability to smooth 
consumption in the event of shocks is limited, in some cases severely. In response to 
the Townsend paper discussed above, Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) published a 
study in which they identify a number of methodological problems with the 
Townsend paper and provide evidence that these issues significantly influence the 
empirical estimates. In particular, they show that by running a more appropriate 
specification on the same data (e.g., accounting for year-specific effects and 
instrumenting for income sources unrelated to farm production), consumption 
responses to idiosyncratic income variation are large. Asfaw and Von Braun (2004) 
present evidence from rural Ethiopia that when the head of household moves from a 
healthy status to an unhealthy status, purchased food consumption and nonfood 
consumption declines significantly. They do not detect a significant effect on total 
food consumption, suggesting that households are substituting home-grown or 
home-made food for purchased food. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) also demonstrate 
within the rural Ethiopian context that, while average consumption across 
households is stable across years, idiosyncratic shocks such as rainfall and crop 
failure produce high variability in household-level consumption over seasons and 
years.  Even in the Indian context, Rose (1999) presents evidence from rural India 
that favorable rainfall shocks (e.g., rainfall that does not result in flooding) increase 
the ratio of the probability that a girl survives to the probability that a boy survives. 
Assuming that a household’s preference for daughters relative to sons is stable, it 
suggests that households may be constrained in some choices due to shocks even if 
not in ways that would be visible through measures of household consumption. 
 
The discussion above suggests that households are able to smooth consumption 
over shocks to some degree but not completely. To understand why consumption 
smoothing may be incomplete and why we observe variation in ability to smooth 
consumption, it is important to understand the mechanisms used to smooth 
consumption. Households can smooth consumption in the event of a shock by: (1) 
utilizing income stabilization (ex ante diversification of production or making 
conservative employment choices), (2) engaging in intertemporal transfers 
(borrowing/ lending, stockpiling of goods, accumulation/ sale of assets), and (3) 
making inter-household transfers or risk-pooling (insurance policies, informal state-
contingent transfers, “disguised” insurance in labor or credit contracts). A similar 
list of methods is outlined by Morduch (1995). Although these methods of 
smoothing income are not equally efficient, if one method is not available (for 
example, there may exist constraints on how much households can save securely), 
households may rely more heavily on a less efficient method, which has welfare 
costs. For example, in the absence of credit markets, households may choose to 
protect themselves against shocks by making conservative production or 
employment decisions, which are likely to have large efficiency costs. Liquidating 
assets to finance consumption smoothing can also be very inefficient compared to 
other methods. Households may also de-prioritize important investments with high 
long-term returns, such as their children’s education, in order to use school fees and 
perhaps the child’s labor to maintain a steady level of consumption in the household 
(Edmonds 2008). 
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A number of papers provide evidence that each of these channels is used in 
developing countries to smooth income to some extent.  In the case of savings, 
Paxson (1992) shows that when households in Thailand receive a positive income 
shock (using rainfall as a proxy), they tend to save more with the implication that 
this saving would allow for smooth consumption in times of a negative income 
shock. With respect to adjusting labor supply, Kochar (1999) finds that in response 
to crop income shocks, male adults of households in rural India increase off-farm 
labor hours. Although a reduced-form regression reveals no significant effect of 
shocks on consumption, she shows that once hours of work are controlled for, crop 
income shocks negatively impact consumption.  
 
With regard to assets, Chaudhuri and Paxson (2001) find evidence from three 
Indian villages that households tend to accumulate assets in seasons of stable 
income and deplete them in seasons of low or negative income.  Furthermore, they 
find that this is a more important channel than borrowing to smooth consumption 
in the event of shock. Using the same dataset, Rozensweig and Wolpin (1989) show 
similar behavior across years, where households accumulate animal stock and 
mechanical agricultural assets in stable years and liquidate them in order to smooth 
consumption in response to economic shocks. They conclude that there is 
substantial underinvestment in animal stock as a result of the constraints on 
farmers’ abilities to smooth consumption via the credit market. Liquidating assets 
may aid in smoothing consumption, but it comes at the cost of productive efficiency. 
Chetty and Looney (2005) provide further evidence that individuals deplete 
productive investments in response to shocks. They show that in both the US and 
Indonesia, food consumption falls only about ten percent when individuals become 
unemployed. In contrast to households in the US however, Indonesians seem to 
smooth their consumption through methods that are more costly in the long-run 
such as reducing human capital investment.  
 
Having children work is another method that some households employ to maintain 
consumption levels in the event of shocks. In many poor households of developing 
countries, children are an important source of income. For example, Menon, Pareli, 
and Rosati (2005) estimate children contribute about 11 percent of the total 
agricultural production in Nepal. Psacharopoulos (1997) estimates that income 
from child labor can contribute up to 13% of total household income in Bolivia. 
There is evidence that this reliance increases in times of negative income shock. 
Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) find that in Tanzania, self-reported negative crop 
shock is correlated with higher rates of child labor. Duryea, Lam, and Levison 
(2007) find that among urban Brazilian households, when the male head becomes 
unemployed, the probability that the child of the household enters the labor force 
increases. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence which suggests that the impact 
of negative shocks on child labor is even greater in an environment of constrained 
credit. Dehejia and Gatti (2002) use cross-country data to show that greater level of 
credit constraints are correlated with greater incidence of child labor, even after 
controlling for a wide range of variables. In the previously mentioned study by 
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Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2006), the impact of negative income shock on child labor 
is particularly pronounced on households with low levels of assets. Reliance on child 
labor in events of shock may very well have a range of negative outcomes for the 
children in the long-run in terms of health and education. Psacharopoulos (1997) 
estimates that children in wage work in Bolivia have nearly one year less completed 
schooling than nonworking children. This difference is 2 years in Venezuela. 
Kassouf, McKee, and Mossialos (2001) find that Brazilians who start working at an 
earlier age have worse self-reported health as an adult. O’Donnell, Doorslaer, and 
Rosati (2005) show that individuals in Vietnam who worked in agriculture as 
children have higher self-reported morbidity rates as young adults. They attempt to 
instrument for child labor with land holdings. Although not all of these studies 
employ an experimental design and hence we cannot definitely rule out biases in 
their measurement of the impact of child labor on long-run outcomes, they do 
strongly suggest that the families utilizing child labor in response to negative 
income shocks do so at the expense of longer-run benefit.  
 
Finally, there is evidence that even marriage markets may be influenced by the 
consumption-smoothing behavior of households. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) 
show that in rural India, marriage of daughters into households that are 
geographically further away contribute significantly to a reduction in variability of 
household food consumption. They also show that farm households with greater 
variability in crop profits tend to marry their daughters into households that are a 
greater distance away, suggesting that households in rural India use the marriage 
market as a way to help smooth consumption. Since income risk is spatially 
correlated in rural India (e.g., households that farm land close to each other are 
subject to similar weather-related risks, and therefore income risk), Rosenzweig 
and Stark interpret their findings as evidence that households in this context use the 
marriage of daughters to manage income risk from farming. By marrying off 
daughters to more distant villages with different weather patterns and risks, the 
authors posit that households engage in implicit contracts of risk-sharing through 
the marriage market. Furthermore, methods for smoothing income can also differ by 
economic class. For example, Townsend (1995) shows from a field study of villages 
in northern Thailand that relatively wealthy households tend to smooth 
consumption through the depletion of assets while the relatively poor tend to 
increase labor supply to finance consumption smoothing. 
 
In theory, a Pareto optimal outcome would be for households to pool their 
consumption risk and insure one another. Even if formal financial markets are thin, 
there are reasons to believe that informal insurance arrangements could sufficiently 
mitigate income risk that households face. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) develop a 
theoretical framework where locally-based informal institutions such as credit 
cooperatives and rotating savings/credit schemes could overcome moral hazard 
problems faced by formal financial entities by having better information about the 
individuals involved (called “peer monitoring”). However, even if the challenges of 
moral hazard are overcome, if enforcement capacity is limited, theory suggests that 
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consumption-smoothing through informal arrangements for risk-sharing will be 
incomplete (Coate and Ravallion 1993). 
 
The above examples suggest that even if individuals are able to smooth 
consumption to a moderate degree in response to shocks, they often are forced to do 
so in a way that has repercussions for their livelihoods in the longer term (especially 
the liquidation of productive assets and investments). Hence, this literature 
indicates that consumption smoothing and sustainable livelihoods are closely 
linked, and interventions to improve outcomes in one can also impact the other. If 
financial markets were more complete, individuals could in theory smooth their 
consumption without having to liquidate their inventories. Indeed, Dupas and 
Robinson (2008) show through a field experiment that providing savings accounts 
resulted in substantial, positive effects on productive investment levels for women. 
They also present some evidence that having a savings account enabled female 
entrepreneurs to cope with shocks without having to liquidate their inventories. 
One could also imagine that the provision of more complete credit markets could 
have a similar effect, allowing households to borrow to smooth consumption over 
shocks rather than liquidate assets. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that 
microfinance could positively impact consumption smoothing as well as longer-
term livelihoods by shifting the means by which individuals finance consumption 
smoothing to more efficient methods. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Overall impact of microfinance on consumption smoothing 
 
Although theory indicates that microfinance should help clients smooth 
consumption in more efficient ways by improving access to credit, the impact of 
microfinance on the ability of the poor to cope with shocks has been documented by 
very few studies. Below, we present two quasi-experimental studies that measure 
the impact of microfinance services on households’ ability to smooth consumption 
in the event of a shock. We refer to these studies as “quasi-experimental” since they 
lack the key ingredient to a true experiment testing for a causal relationship 
between two or more variables- random assignment to treatment or control. While 
random assignment gives greater confidence that treatment and control groups are 
similar along all the important dimensions, quasi-experimental studies are forced to 
use econometric and statistical tools to address potential selection bias in their 
treatment assignment. Using the tools available to quasi-experimental studies, both 
papers described below find that access to financial services significantly reduced 
the likelihood of a household decreasing consumption in the event of illness or other 
major difficulties. Although typically a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) design is 
considered the most rigorous test for a causal association, to the best of our 
knowledge, no one has attempted to establish a causal relationship between 
microfinance services and consumption smoothing using a RCT design.  
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Kaboski and Townsend (2005) use the presence of a banking institution (formal or 
MFI) in the villages of four provinces of rural Thailand as an instrument for 
membership in a banking institution. In a cross-sectional survey, households were 
asked whether they needed to reduce consumption “in a bad year” as a measure of 
ability to smooth consumption over shocks. They estimate the impact for each type 
of banking institution, and find that banking institutions that provide savings 
services and emergency services significantly reduce the likelihood that a household 
needs to reduce consumption in a bad year. Gertler et al (2009) uses a similar 
strategy in Indonesia, using distance to a MFI branch office as exogenous variation 
for the treatment. The paper focuses on the relationship between change in 
consumption and change in health status in Indonesia. The paper finds that greater 
access to a MFI branch (e.g., closer in distance to a MFI branch) results in greater 
ability to maintain consumption levels in response to declines in health experienced 
by working-age adults in the household.  
 
Although to the best of our knowledge there have been no RCT studies conducted to 
directly measure the impact of microfinance on consumption smoothing, we present 
two studies here which utilize an RCT design and provide some relevant and 
interesting evidence supporting the hypothesis that microfinance increases the 
ability of households to smooth consumption. First, Karlan and Zinman (2008) have 
some secondary outcomes in their study that are relevant. They ran an experiment 
in South Africa in which they randomly assigned applicants who were initially 
deemed “marginally un-creditworthy” to either receive credit (Treatment) or not 
(Control). Several months after credit was extended to the treatment group, they 
measured the impact of the treatment on a wide range of outcome variables. Among 
other conclusions, they find that applicants in the treatment group were 
significantly less likely to experience hunger, more likely to retain their job over the 
study period and more likely to increase income. Although not a direct measure of 
consumption, the fact that those with access to credit were less likely to report 
hunger indicates a more steady level of food consumption over the study period, 
and hence is evidence of the impact of financial services (though not microfinance, 
per se) on consumption-smoothing.  
 
Feigenberg et al (2010) study the impact of increasing the frequency of group 
meetings for typical Grameen-style microfinance clients on the breadth and depth of 
their social networks, using measures such as frequency of meeting with loan group 
members outside of repayment meetings, frequency of financial transfers to friends 
and relatives outside of their immediate family, and level of trust of other group 
members as indicated by survey. In addition, the study authors use an innovative 
lottery game where clients could increase their chance of winning the lottery but 
only by sharing the tickets with other group members. Using these measures, they 
find strong evidence that more frequent meetings expanded and strengthened the 
social networks of clients, increasing transfers and presumably improving risk-
sharing among clients. Although they did not directly measure consumption 
smoothing, the results indicate that, by strengthening social networks, microfinance 
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services enabled greater risk-sharing across group members and therefore 
increased the ability to smooth consumption. 
 
Lastly, there is some evidence that “vulnerability” or inability of a household to 
smooth income may itself directly impede a household’s ability to engage in higher-
yield activities in developing countries. Pearlman (2007) presents a model in which 
vulnerability leads households to opt for lower-yield/lower-risk enterprises. She 
also presents empirical evidence that lends support for her model by using data 
from a set of microfinance clients in Peru. She also shows that microfinance may 
mitigate the negative impact of vulnerability on entrepreneurial activity, by showing 
that households participating in microfinance services dedicate more resources to 
high-yield, high-risk projects. 
 
In the broader research agenda of measuring the impact of microfinance on client 
outcomes, recent RCT studies have revealed two important new findings: First, 
microfinance services have heterogeneous impact on different types of clients with 
different implications for consumption and profit-generation. Second, features of 
microfinance that have been strictly emphasized in the past may not be as 
important in making microfinance activities sustainable (e.g., maintaining low rates 
of default) than previously believed. Banerjee et al (2009) illuminates the 
heterogeneous impact of microfinance services across different sub-groups of 
clients.  This paper used random assignment to designate which slums in Hydrabad, 
India would receive a MFI branch. For the overall sample they found that the 
treatment (access to microfinance services) had no significant impact on total 
household expenditure per adult. However, the paper goes further to split the 
sample into “present business owners”, “likely entrepreneurs”, and “not likely to be 
entrepreneurs” by predicting on demographic variables not affected by treatment. 
When they measured impact for these different groups, those “not likely to be 
entrepreneurs” show large and significant increase in nondurable spending which 
were not detectable in the overall sample. Those who were “present business 
owners” or “likely entrepreneurs”, however, showed increase in investment in 
business assets as well as a slight decline in nondurable consumption. Karlan and 
Gine (2010) show through a RCT conducted in the Philippines that loan groups with 
individual liability did not have higher levels of default relative to loan groups with 
group liability.  
 
With recent research indicating that microfinance has heterogeneous impact on 
clients and that traditional design of the microfinance contract may not be optimal, 
we turn to the question of whether another aspect of the traditional Grameen-style 
microloan contract- the strict weekly repayment schedule starting immediately 
after loan disbursement- can be modified to improve client outcomes especially 
with regards to consumption smoothing. 
 
2.3 Flexibility in repayment schedules and consumption smoothing 
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Economic theory gives two possible predictions for how more flexible repayment 
schedules could impact consumption smoothing. On one hand, if microfinance 
clients are rational actors, a more flexible loan repayment schedule (for instance, 
lower frequency repayment installments) should improve clients’ ability to smooth 
consumption when faced with income shocks relative to a traditional weekly 
repayment schedule. However, if clients are not time-consistent or have self-control 
or intra-household issues that make saving difficult, repayment flexibility may 
actually increase the volatility of their consumption.  
 
Akerlof (1991) applies the time-inconsistent, present-biased model of individual 
behavior to a diverse set of situations and shows how this pattern of behavior can 
lead to general procrastination, under-savings, drug use, and other “pathological 
behaviors”. Every day, the cost of executing on the target task (saving money for 
repayment or stopping the use of drugs for example) seems greater than the cost of 
doing it in the future. Under these assumptions, this behavior often leads to 
problematic outcomes. In the context of microfinance loans, more flexible 
repayment schedules (for example, monthly repayment rather than weekly) means 
that individuals will have more time to procrastinate in gathering money for 
repayment and the consequences for failing to gather the repayment sum will be 
greater since each payment is larger. In a similar vein, Heidhues and Koszegi 
(forthcoming) show that non-sophisticated present-biased borrowers tend to 
overborrow, pay the penalties and back-load repayment. In this course of events, 
these individuals suffer large welfare losses. Fischer and Ghatak (2010) present a 
model in which more frequent repayment decreases default rates for present-biased 
individuals. When individuals are present-biased, smaller and more frequent 
repayments decrease temptation to default for immediate gain. However, the 
welfare effects of more frequent repayment are ambiguous in this model since 
frequent repayments are costly for both clients and MFIs. Finally, by not considering 
the possibility that greater flexibility in repayment may allow for more optimal 
project choice and hence greater profits, the authors shut out another channel of 
potential economic gain (and improvements in long run ability to smooth income). 
 
On the other hand, even with time-inconsistent preferences, individuals may be 
sophisticated enough to use financial tools in order to control outcomes for future 
selves. For example, Basu (2009) presents a model in which sophisticated but time-
inconsistent borrowers use loans to provide incentives for future selves to not over-
consume. He presents this model as one possible explanation of why people are 
often both borrowing and saving at the same time. By borrowing in the present 
rather than using cash in savings, individuals are establishing large costs for future 
selves to over-consume. 
 
Empirical evidence on the effect of repayment frequency on client welfare is 
ambiguous and limited. A number of large MFIs have experimented over the last few 
years with more flexible repayment schedules only to revert back due to emerging 
evidence that the MFI believed showed that flexible repayment led to increase in 
delinquencies (Fischer and Ghatak 2010 and Armendariz and Morduch 2005). In 
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contrast, McIntosh (2007) ran a quasi-experimental study in Uganda which used 
geographical variation in loan administration by the partner MFI. In some branches, 
groups of clients were allowed to choose repaying loans every week to every two 
weeks. He found that the shift caused none of the predicted negative effects (e.g., no 
increase in default rate), and instead found that dropout fell by 10 percentage points 
and repayment performance slight improved. In line with McIntosh, the authors of 
this paper have conducted a RCT experiment with a partner MFI organization in 
India where we allowed an extra “grace period” of two months before commencing 
repayment. Our preliminary results show that clients who were given a grace period 
were significantly more likely to default. They were, however, also more likely to 
make riskier but higher return activities. Whether this behavior led to better 
consumption smoothing in the long run is an open question. Finally, further 
evidence that flexibility in repayment can help smooth consumption comes from 
Shoji (2010), who studies the effect of allowing microfinance clients in Bangladesh 
to reschedule their repayments after a nation-wide flood in 2004. He finds that 
clients who did not reschedule their payments increased their likelihood of skipping 
a meal by 2.48% for female clients and 0.53% for male clients. 
 
In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that, although the poor in developing 
countries have some recourse to smooth their consumption in the event of shocks, 
in many cases consumption smoothing is incomplete. Moreover, the methods used 
to finance consumption smoothing are often inefficient and can have detrimental 
effects on long-term earnings for the household. In theory, access to credit through 
microfinance should both allow for better smoothing of consumption as well as a 
shift away from more inefficient ways to finance consumption smoothing. Existing 
studies (for example, Karlan and Zinman 2008 and Dupas and Robinson 2010) 
provide some evidence that microfinance services increase ability to smooth 
consumption and/or shift the ways in which consumption smoothing is financed to 
more efficient means. With emerging evidence that microfinance has heterogeneous 
effects on sub-segments of clients as well as evidence that traditional elements of 
the microfinance contract may not be the optimal, one natural question to ask with 
regards to consumption smoothing is whether the traditional, strict weekly 
repayment schedule is best. The theoretical literature gives somewhat ambiguous 
predictions for how flexible repayment schedules will impact consumption 
smoothing. If clients are rational actors or if they are “sophisticated”, more flexible 
repayment schedules should allow clients to smooth consumption at least as well as 
under a traditional weekly schedule and should provide them with significant 
consumption-smoothing benefits in the event of shocks. If on the other hand, clients 
are present-biased and “unsophisticated” flexible repayment schedules may result 
in potentially more volatile consumption patterns. Since rigorous empirical 
evidence to give credence to one theory versus another is limited, we hope to help 
fill that gap by analyzing our unique dataset of daily consumption patterns from our 
RCT experiment in India which uses random assignment of loan groups to monthly 
(e.g. more flexible) versus weekly (e.g. traditional) repayment schedules.  
  
3 Measuring Consumption 
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In order to truly understand consumption smoothing and liquidity constraints 
among the poor, one needs data that accurately measures consumption levels, 
income, and assets of households over time. Particularly for consumption data, 
several potential sources of reporting error have been documented in the 
Economics literature, the most important of which are recall mistakes, inability to 
capture total household consumption, and level of aggregation of consumption 
categories (Beegle et al, 2010). In our project, we have attempted to mitigate the 
risks posed by each while keeping logistical demands and costs of surveying 
reasonably low through a novel survey implementation strategy that leverages cell 
phone technology available in our study region. 
 
Firstly, recall error, or the misreporting of true consumption by the respondent over 
the period of recall due to faulty memory, has been documented by several studies 
to be a major source of bias in consumption survey data. More specifically, longer 
recall periods tend to be associated with greater under-reporting of consumption. 
For example, the experiments conducted by Scott and Amenuvegbe (1990) with 
households from the Ghanaian Living Standards Survey concluded that reported 
expenditures fell at an average of 2.9 percent for every day added to the recall 
period. Since the focus of our study is not only the average level of consumption but 
also its fluctuation over time, high-frequency data is even more critical to ensure 
accurate and precise measurements. As Samphantharak and Townsend (2010) 
write, “high frequency data is necessary for the analysis of liquidity, the short-term 
smoothing of consumption, the protection of investment from cash flow 
fluctuations, and the financing of cash flow budget deficits.”  
 
A second important source of error is the inability of the survey respondent to 
account for total household consumption. Individual consumption, particularly by 
other adult members of the household, may occur outside the knowledge of the 
survey respondent and may not be captured in the consumption survey. For 
example, Beegle et al (2010) compare several different methods for collecting 
consumption data among households in Tanzania using a randomized experimental 
design.  In one treatment arm, each household was given a household consumption 
diary while in another treatment arm, each adult member of each household was 
given a personal consumption diary. The first treatment arm produced mean 
consumption measures that were 19 percent lower than the second, providing 
evidence that the traditional approach of relying on one adult respondent under-
estimates consumption activities for the household. Similar results were found in 
experiments with personal and household consumption diaries in Russia (World 
Bank 2005) 
 
The last source of potential error is the level of aggregation of consumption 
categories. On one hand, it is necessary to disaggregate consumption to some extent 
to get reasonably accurate responses about total expenditure levels (Deaton 1997). 
Moreover, there is evidence that reducing the number of categories into which 
consumption is disaggregated lowers total expenditure reported (Deaton 1997). 
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However, longer questionnaires often entail higher survey costs, more time, and risk 
of greater non-response and survey attrition.  
 
Due to the high cost and logistical complexity of collecting accurate and detailed 
consumption data on a real-time basis, empirical data on day-to-day consumption 
patterns of the poor in developing countries have been limited. Previous studies 
have largely relied on questions that risk the noise and bias of imperfect recall, often 
over long reference periods (e.g., “how many times have you run out of food in the 
last year?”) or on datasets that provide detailed consumption data but from a very 
small sample size over short time periods.   
 
A major innovation of our project is to produce a dataset that contains detailed 
information about daily expenditures and consumption from 200 Indian households 
over 50 days using cell phone technology. We call this effort the Daily Consumption 
Survey (DCS) project.  The DCS survey was administered to each client via cell 
phone every other day for a total of 25 times, covering a time period of 50 days in 
total. Each DCS participant was offered the option of taking two pre-purchased 
CDMA phones, one for the client and one for her husband, locked with a pre-
determined service provider. In total, 350 phones were distributed, 200 to 
respondents and 150 to husbands. Air time for surveys was pre-paid by the 
experiment. To provide incentives to participate in the survey and to ensure that the 
phones were returned at the end of the survey period, participating clients were 
offered Rs. 5 for every call answered by them or their husband, deliverable upon the 
return of the cell phones at the end of the survey period.  
 
Each time a client was surveyed, she was asked questions about her own earnings, 
transfers received and sent, and loans. She was also asked about the household’s 
expenditure on food, housing, education, healthcare, loan repayment, and savings 
installments. Lastly, she was asked about the time she spent working and her level 
of mental stress related to loan repayment and finances. Each time a client was 
surveyed, her husband was also surveyed and asked about his earnings, transfers 
received and set, and loan payments. He was also asked about time spent working 
and his level of mental stress related to loan repayment and finances. Each 
administration of the survey took on average 12 to 13 minutes and 90% of surveys 
took less than 25 minutes. Response rates were very high, with only two survey 
administrations missing from the 5000 total surveys that were collected (200 
clients with 25 surveys each). 
 
In addition to contributing a unique dataset to the economic development field, the 
DCS addresses many of the potential sources of bias in the collection of consumption 
data outlined above. First, by contacting the respondent household every 48 hours, 
we capture a nearly real-time view of consumption activity of the household, 
mitigating the potential for recall bias. Another major benefit of our data collection 
strategy is to use enumerators to collect data as opposed to relying on self-reporting 
in consumption dairies, in which the frequency and consistency of reporting is 
difficult or impossible to monitor. By making use of cell phone technology, we were 
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able to employ a relatively costly approach (enumerators) in a cost effective 
manner.  This approach also helped cut down on non-response and non-
participation because it was also lower cost for clients to participate relative to the 
hassle and recall problems of having to fill out a daily consumption diary. 
 
Finally, this method allowed us to interview multiple members of the household 
without having to return to the household at multiple times during the day, which 
gave us the possibility of surveying both husbands and wives without enormous 
added costs or selection of participating households. This aspect of our consumption 
survey is another major advantage to these data. That is, in addition to surveying the 
microfinance client, we also interviewed her husband for each survey, asking 
complementary but non-overlapping questions that would help produce a more 
complete picture of household consumption. Lastly, we balanced the need to get 
more detailed consumption data from respondents with the concern of survey 
fatigue by choosing 62 consumption categories to be included in the survey for 
clients (excluding questions about income or business investment). 
 
4 Our MFI partner 
 
Our project was implemented with our partner MFI, the Village Financial Services 
(VFS), which started operations in the Indian state of West Bengal in 1982. It is 
larger than the typical MFI in India, with nearly 60 offices, total assets of 30.1 
million USD, and 184,000 active borrowers as of 2009, compared to the median 
Indian MFI which has 27 offices, 10.7 million USD and 65,000 active borrowers.  
 
In light of the current debate on the impact of MFIs on clients’ welfare in India, 
additional statistics on VFS’ finances and operations may be of interest. Compared to 
a median Indian MFI, VFS clients carry a lower loan balance with the average loan 
balance per borrower/ GNI per capita at 12% for VFS versus 14% for the median 
Indian MFI. VFS also achieves a lower return on assets and return on equity, 1.1% 
and 7.1% respectively, compared to 1.8% and 10.5% for the median Indian MFI. VFS 
has a borrower to staff member ratio of 338 which is greater than the 75th 
percentile for all Indian MFIs and their cost per borrower, at 15 USD is equal to the 
median. The percentage of their portfolio at risk greater than 90 days is 0.54% 
compared to the median of 0.33% for all Indian MFIs (MIX Market 2011). 
 
Despite being in an urban environment, VFS clients seem to have limited outside 
borrowing. In our baseline survey, only 6.2% of our entire sample report having 
taken out a non-VFS loan in the past two years.  
 
5 Experimental Design  
 
5. 1 Overall sampling and treatment design 
 
The respondents participating in the DCS project were a subset of a larger sample of 
VFS microfinance clients who were participating in an experiment about the effect 
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of flexible repayment schedules. Between January and September 2008 we formed 
148 five-member groups comprising of 740 clients. Loan sizes varied from Rs. 4000 
to 12000 (~$90 to $260), with a modal loan size of Rs. 10000. After group formation 
and prior to loan disbursement, groups were randomly assigned to either a five-
week repayment schedule or a weekly repayment schedule. Treatment status was 
assigned to batches of 20 groups at a time based on the timing of group formation.3 
For these 740 clients, we conducted baseline and endline surveys which contain 
information about consumption, household shocks, housing, assets and income, 
transfers, employment, business activity, and women’s empowerment, among other 
topics.4 
 
Clients assigned to five-week repayment schedules met and repaid their loans every 
five weeks, while clients assigned to the weekly repayment followed the traditional 
schedule of meeting and repaying every week. Other features of the loan contract 
were held constant across the two groups, including interest rates at 12%. Both 
groups had 45 weeks from the time of the loan disbursement to repay their loans in 
full. For the majority (nearly 90%) of clients in the DCS dataset, the first DCS survey 
was given at least 45 days after the loan disbursement. 
 
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 1 provide a randomization check for the entire sample 
group. On average, weekly and five-week clients look similar at baseline across a 
wide range of observable characteristics. Four out of the 27 differences are 
statistically significant at the 10% level: whether a client is Muslim, literate, 
transfers reported into the household in the past year, and whether loan size was 
Rs. 7000. A monthly client was more likely to be Muslim on average, was slightly 
more likely to be literate, received more transfers into the household in the past 
year5, and was more likely to have a loan size of Rs. 7000.6  
 
5. 2 Sampling and methodology for the Daily Consumption Survey 
 
Of the 740 clients participating in the larger VFS experiment, we selected 105 five-
week clients and 105 weekly clients and invited them to participate in the DCS 
project. Due to a major festival scheduled to occur several weeks after the start of 
the DCS survey (Durga Puja), we had to choose the five-week clients from among the 
21 five-week groups whose starting date would ensure that the DCS survey could 
                                                        
3 One exception is the first batch of treatment groups, which comprise of 12 groups assigned to a 
four-week repayment schedule as opposed to a five-week repayment schedule. The change to a five-
week repayment schedule was made to better accommodate VFS’ logistical needs. 
4 Appendix C discusses the decisions made regarding the experiment design in greater detail. 
5 The fact that monthly clients report receiving more transfers in the past year may suggest that 
monthly clients have better access to financial resources and/or that they need more financial help 
from others. However, the fact that we see no differential rate of incidence of shocks between 
monthly and weekly clients is one piece of evidence against the argument that monthly clients need 
more financial help. 
6 Note that when we measure loan size as a continuous variable, we see no difference between 
treatment and control. Comparing loan size as a series of dummy variables is a more conservative 
way to measure differences between the two groups. 
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run from one repayment to the next without interruption of this festival.7 We 
randomly selected 105 clients from the 370 weekly clients in the larger experiment, 
resulting in 42 of the 74 weekly groups being represented in DCS.  23 of the 210 
initial clients dropped out, 11 from control and 12 from treatment; hence, there is 
no differential attrition between weekly and five-week clients in terms of number of 
respondents. We randomly sampled from the remaining clients in the larger 
experiment to replace 6 clients in control and 7 clients in treatment for a final total 
of 200 clients participating in the DCS survey. In Appendix B Table 1, we compare 
clients who left the original sample versus those who make up the final sample 
along a range of traits- discount rates (measure of patience), income, and 
employment status. We find no evidence that those in the final sample are more 
patient than those who attrited, mitigating one potential concern regarding the 
external validity of our results. We do find evidence that suggests that those who 
attritted from the sample were slightly less likely to be working in the past week (90 
percent versus 98 percent). 
 
As is best practice in RCT studies, Columns (5)-(8) of Table 1 provide a 
randomization check for the DCS sample. On average, weekly and five-week clients 
look similar at baseline across a wide range of observable characteristics. Only two 
out of the 27 differences are statistically significant at the 10% level: whether a 
client is married and whether a client has a loan size of Rs. 5000. A monthly client 
was less likely to be married and to have a loan size of Rs. 5000.  The first difference 
raise some concern that unconditional comparisons will produce biased 
experimental estimates due to the fact that unmarried clients are better able to 
smooth consumption due to residing in multiple-earner households (for instance, if 
they reside with their parents and siblings). The second difference raises the 
concern that that clients with larger loans are better able to smooth consumption 
due to the fact that they have more money to set aside in savings; however, 
comparing loan size as a continuous variable between weekly and five-week clients 
suggests that overall, there is no significant difference in loan size between the two 
groups. To account for these small differences between treatment and control 
groups, we always report estimates from regressions that include all the controls 
listed in Panel A of Table 1. Moreover, we report estimates from regressions that 
include all controls but the married dummy variable and the loan size variable in 
Appendix B Tables 3-8. 
 
6 Predictions 
 
There are many reasons to believe that access to credit should raise household 
incomes and enable consumption-smoothing among the poor. If the poor in 
developing countries are credit-constrained, microfinance programs should help 
them invest in profitable enterprises as well as cope with the negative shocks in 
their lives more effectively. However, as discussed in the literature review, the 
                                                        
7 It was important to avoid surveying around the time of this festival both because nonresponse 
would be high, and because consumption patterns would be highly irregular.  
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results of rigorous experimental studies conducted in recent years suggest that 
microfinance, as currently practiced, has zero to very small average effect on the 
welfare of the poor, including on household income (Banerjee et al 2009). 
 
Our experiment is designed to explore this apparent paradox- if there are 
compelling theoretical reasons to believe that microfinance should help the poor, 
why do we not see more robust empirical results? We make two observations that 
we believe are relevant to this question: First, the microfinance model is remarkably 
uniform across the developing world, with nearly all microfinance organizations 
employing the group lending model with weekly repayment schedules starting 
almost immediately after disbursement.  Secondly, when we compare microfinance 
programs in the developing world to small business loans in the US, we see that 
American small business loans offer significantly more flexibility in repayment 
schedules – for example, allowing a grace period before beginning repayment and 
mandating less frequent repayments. Small business loans in the US also experience 
much higher default rates – typically between 13-15% compared to 2-5% in 
microfinance (Glennon and Nigro 2005). 
 
Can this difference in default rates and repayment schedules between American 
small business loans and microfinance help explain why current models of 
microfinance do not significantly impact household income? We hypothesize that 
the rigid repayment schedules commonly used in microfinance- weekly repayments 
beginning almost immediately after loan disbursement- inhibit clients’ ability to 
invest in more profitable but also higher-risk business opportunities. With 
repayment beginning soon after disbursement, clients may be hindered in investing 
in the inventory, raw materials, and equipment that would yield higher returns. As a 
hypothetical example, consider an owner of a small hardware store in a developing 
country. He might know that buying and selling higher-quality light fixtures would 
yield more profits, but he cannot use his microfinance loan to buy this inventory 
because higher-quality light fixtures do not sell as quickly as lower-quality ones; 
hence, he will not have the money in time to make his first repayment if he invests 
in this more illiquid (but more profitable) inventory. Under a more flexible 
repayment schedule where he has a grace period before starting repayment and/or 
he repays every month instead of every week, this hypothetical client may be able to 
invest in the higher-quality inventory. However, this increases default risk as well, 
since in the case of a negative shock (for example, illness or accidents), the client 
will be less able to liquidate his investment in order to meet his unexpected costs as 
well as repayment obligations. 
 
For the formal theoretical framework of this paper, please refer to the model 
presented in the companion paper by Field, Pande, Papp and Rigol (2011). Although 
the companion paper tests the impact of an extended grace period of 2 months prior 
to the commencement of loan repayment (a variation of flexibility in loan 
repayment), the basic predictions of the model are also applicable to a situation 
where loan repayment occurs every five weeks versus weekly. In the context of 
consumption smoothing, we can derive the following relevant predictions: 
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Prediction 1 Moving from a weekly to a five-week repayment schedule will increase 
average client profits and the variance of profits. 
Similar to the reasoning in Field et al (2011), a client who has five weeks between 
loan repayments will increase her illiquid asset investment. This investment has 
higher expected return for the client. Variance of profits also increases in the 
amount invested in the illiquid asset investment. 
 
Prediction 2 Moving from a weekly to a five-week repayment schedule will increase 
the level of household consumption and decrease the variability in the level of 
consumption. 
Increased income from household businesses will increase the level of household 
consumption under the five-week repayment schedule. The variability in the level of 
consumption will also decrease because clients will have a longer time horizon to 
prepare for the next loan repayment, mitigating impact on consumption from 
shocks in expenditure or income. 
 
Prediction 3 Moving from a weekly to a five-week repayment schedule will increase 
default. 
Similar to the reasoning in Field et al (2011), a client who has five weeks between 
loan repayments will increase her illiquid asset investment, which is more likely to 
fail and force the client to default. 
 
Prediction 4 Moving from a weekly to a five-week repayment schedule will decrease 
mental stress if cost of saving to make larger repayments is lower than benefits from 
greater loan flexibility.   
The impact of moving from a weekly to a five-week repayment schedule is not clear 
a priori. On one hand, clients may experience less mental stress from increased 
income and smoother consumption. On the other hand, however, clients may incur 
some type of psychic cost in maintaining fiscal discipline in order to prepare a larger 
sum for repayment every five weeks. 
 
7 Empirical Strategy 
 
Randomization of repayment schedule implies that simple comparison of the 
average outcomes across clients assigned to the weekly versus five-week repayment 
schedules has a causal interpretation. Hence, for all outcome variables we estimate 
simple ordinary least squares regressions of the following form: 
 
(1)  
 
 
where ydig is the outcome of interest for client i in group g on day d and Tg is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the five-week 
repayment schedule. All regressions include dummies for stratification batch (Bg), 
day of the week (Pdig), whether the survey was taken in the morning (Mdig), number 
of weeks since disbursement (Wdig), and the calendar week (Cdig). Throughout, we 
igigdigdigdigdigggdig XCWMPBTy εδββ ++++++++= 10
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report regressions with and without the nine controls (Xig) listed in Panel A of Table 
1 and loan officer fixed effects.8 In all regressions, standard errors are corrected for 
clustering within loan groups. 
 
In order to address potential serial correlation concerns, we also run regressions 
after aggregating outcomes at the weekly level and present these in Appendix A 
Tables 1-4. 
 
For certain variables, we will attempt to focus on the two days immediately prior to 
the loan repayment, since it would be reasonable to believe that some outcomes 
(such as measures of mental stress or food consumption) would be more sensitive 
to repayment flexibility in the days immediately preceding the loan repayment. We 
do this by using two methods: Firstly, we “smooth out” our observations into daily 
values. Since we surveyed households every 48 hours, we create a daily measure of 
each variable by assigning half the income or expenditure reported in each survey to 
two consecutive days. For example, if the survey was taken in the morning of day X, 
half of the value for a given variable was assigned to day X-1 and the other half to 
day X-2. If the survey was taken in the afternoon of day X, half of the value for a 
given variable was assigned to day X and the other half to the day X-1. In cases 
where this leads to two different sets of values being assigned to the same day (for 
example, if a survey is given on the afternoon of day X and the next survey is given 
on the morning of day X+2,  this would result in two values for day X), the two sets 
of values were averaged together. Secondly, we modify equation (1) to add an 
interaction term: 
 
(2) 
 
 where Dd is a dummy variable (referred to “two days before” in the tables) that 
takes the value one if the observation is within two days of a loan repayment and 0 
otherwise. We interact this with the treatment variable Tg to identify the effect of 
the treatment on a given outcome in the two days before a loan repayment. I i  is a 
vector of individual client-level fixed effects. All other variables are the same as in 
(1). 
 
8 Results 
 
We find that the five-week repayment schedule significantly impacted client 
outcomes in six categories: income, expenditures, investment in business 
inventories, hours worked, default, and mental health. 9,10 
                                                        
8 Loan officer fixed effects are dummy variables (one variable for each loan officer), that take the 
value of 1 if a given client has a loan administered by a given loan officer. This is to control for loan 
officer characteristics or practices that may affect client outcome. 
9 We also find that preference for frequency of repayment varies significantly among clients, with 43% reporting 
that they would like to repay in weekly or fortnightly installments, and more than 50% of clients reporting that 
they would like to repay at monthly or even longer intervals. Appendix B Table 2a shows the distribution of 
igigdigdigdigdiggidgddig XCWMPBIDTDy εδβββ ++++++++++= 210 *
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8.1 Income 
 
We start by presenting the evidence of impact on income in Table 2. As outlined in 
section 6, our previous paper on the impact of repayment flexibility on business 
outcomes of clients sets up a theoretical model in which flexible repayment allows 
clients to make investments in business opportunities with higher average 
profitability but more uncertainty (see Field, Pande, Papp and Rigol 2010). 
According to this theoretical model, greater flexibility in repayment should result in 
higher average profits from business but greater variability.  
 
The results presented in Table 2 support Prediction 1. Column (1) shows that total 
income from business and wage sources were significantly higher for five-week 
clients, with five-week clients reporting 88% higher income from business and wage 
sources compared to the mean weekly client. This result is significant at the 5% 
level with and without controls. Columns (2) and (3) show that this gain is driven by 
increase in business income, with five-week clients reporting more than double the 
business income of weekly clients on average. In accordance with the model’s 
predictions, the variability of business income is also significantly greater among 
five-week clients, as presented in Column (4). 
 
8.2 Expenditures 
 
Overall household expenditures appear to rise among five-week clients, as might be 
expected with higher average income, although the percentage increase in 
expenditures is lower than the percentage increase in income reported by five-week 
clients. As presented in Column (1) of Table 3, household expenditures are 10-24% 
higher among five-week clients than weekly clients. This result is significant at the 
5% level without controls and is not robust to the inclusion of control variables.  
 
Total household expenditures are composed of spending on food, house expenses 
(repairs, utilities, etc), education, health, transfers out of the household, repayment 
of non-VFS loans, and other items (clothing, festivals, etc). As shown in Columns (2)-
(8), the increase in household expenditure seems to be primarily driven by increase 
in repayment to non-VFS creditors rather than an increase in spending on food, 
housing stock, education, health, transfers, or other items.  
 
8.3 Investment in Business Inventory 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
repayment frequency preferences and Appendix B Table 2b demonstrates that individual characteristics do not 
have a significant relationship with repayment frequency preferences.  
10 In order to ensure that the small differences between treatment and control for marriage rates and loan size 
are not driving the results, we report the same regression results in Appendix B Tables 3-8 but excluding the 
married and loan size control variables. As shown in the tables, the exclusion of these controls has little effect on 
the results. 
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Although we do not find evidence that flexibility in repayment impacted the level or 
pattern of investment in equipment or raw materials, the results do suggest that the 
five-week repayment clients were able to make larger investments in inventory. 
Column (2) of Table 4 indicates that five-week clients invested 70%-100% more in 
the inventory of their business compared to weekly clients. This result is significant 
at the 5% level without controls; it is not robust to the inclusion of controls. 
 
8.4 Hours worked 
 
While the aggregate number of hours worked by the client and the client’s husband 
do not appear to be affected by the repayment schedule, the additional flexibility of 
the five-week repayment reduced the number of hours other household members 
work. Although the DCS did not explicitly ask who these other household members 
are, they are likely to be secondary earners. Column (2), Panels A and B of Table 5 
show that non-client and non-husband members of five-week households worked 
on average 2.86 hours less compared to the members of weekly households. The 
point estimates imply between a 66% to 75% reduction from the mean number of 
hours worked among weekly households. This result is significant at a 1% level, and 
is robust to the inclusion of controls. 
 
Furthermore, the variability of hours worked by non-client and non-husband 
household members was also lower in five-week households (not reported). This 
result is significant at the 5% level without controls and is not robust to the 
inclusion of controls although the point estimate remains negative. 
 
8.5 Default 
 
We used VFS administrative data to examine whether the repayment schedule had 
any impact on default rates. Using the most recent data available, we were able to 
measure default rates for all the clients in our sample at 12 weeks past the date 
when the entire balance of the loan should have been repaid (the due date), 16 
weeks past the due date, and 20 weeks past the due date. In contrast with the 
companion paper which found that the grace period significantly increased default 
rates (Field, Pande, Papp and Rigol 2011), Table 6 shows that the five-weekly 
repayment schedule did not impact default rates. This finding holds when we limit 
the sample to DCS clients in Panel B of Table 6.  
 
There may be two reasons contributing to this contrasting result. The first may be 
selection; this study was the third intervention we implemented with VFS, and a 
large fraction of clients had also participated in the second and first interventions. 
With each subsequent intervention, the clients who remained with VFS may be 
slightly wealthier or more fiscally responsible, leading to a sample in the third 
intervention that is less susceptible to default compared to the sample in the grace 
period experiment (administered as the second intervention). The second potential 
reason for the differing results may be repayment frequency. While the grace period 
experiment in the second intervention required both treatment and control groups 
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to repay every two weeks (starting immediately for the control group and after the 
two month grace period for the treatment group), the treatment group in this study 
repaid every five weeks throughout the loan cycle, allowing them more time to deal 
effectively with negative shocks between payments and avoid default. 
 
8.6 Mental Health 
 
Lastly, we find significant evidence from the DCS survey that flexibility in repayment 
decreased mental stress on clients. Table 7 presents the results: In Column (2), we 
find that five-week clients were 24-51% less likely to answer that they felt “worried, 
tense, or anxious” about paying their next loan on any given survey in comparison to 
weekly clients. This result is significant at the 5% level with controls and not 
statistically significant without controls, although both point estimates are large 
relative to the control mean and negative. 
 
Column (3) shows that five-week clients were 39-54% less likely to report that they 
were not confident about repaying their next loan on any given survey. This result is 
significant at the 10% level without controls and significant at the 5% with controls. 
 
Column (4) shows that, overall, five-week clients did not spend more or less time 
thinking about their loan. However, Panel C of Column (4) shows that in the two 
days preceding each loan repayment, five-week clients spent 3.2 minutes more 
thinking about the loan than weekly clients. This result is significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
Lastly, Column (5) indicates that five-week clients were between 37-100% less 
likely to report arguing with their spouses about finances in the previous 48 hours. 
This result is significant at the 5% level without controls and is not robust to the 
inclusion of controls.  
 
By interacting the treatment term with a dummy for two days before a loan 
repayment date, we are able to focus on changes occurring right before a loan 
repayment is due. Column (6) shows that five-week clients have considerably more 
negative savings in the two days before a loan is due, likely because the repayment 
amount is greater for five-week clients than weekly clients. Panel A and B results in 
Column (7) suggests that five-week clients receive more transfers from their 
husbands, with lower level of arguments about finances, potentially due to a higher 
level of cash flow from their business. This effect, however, does not appear to be 
concentrated in the days preceding a loan repayment. 
 
8.7 Summary of Findings 
 
The findings of our study provide evidence that increasing repayment flexibility in 
microfinance loan contracts allows clients to change patterns of investment in 
business inventory, resulting in higher business income and therefore, household 
income. We also provide evidence that repayment based on a five-week schedule 
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decreased mental stress over finances significantly for clients, with clients less likely 
to report being worried about money, lacking confidence in their ability to pay their 
next loan installment, or arguing about money with their husbands. Moreover, the 
number of hours worked by members of the household who were neither the client 
nor her husband was significantly lower and had lower variability in five-week 
households. 
 
Although we do not find differences in default between clients with weekly and five-
week repayment schedules, we interpret this finding cautiously in light of our 
previous studies on repayment flexibility. Field, Pande, Papp, and Rigol (2011) find 
that default rates more than double when clients are given a two-month grace 
period before commencing loan repayment. Feigenberg, Field and Pande (2010) ran 
an experiment very similar in design as the one presented in this paper, on first-
time borrowers with VFS. They find that although default did not increase in the 
short-term (e.g., in the loan cycle of the experiment), it did increase among clients 
who were in the 4-week repayment cycle in the subsequent loan cycle even though 
the loan contract structures were exactly the same for all groups after the 
experiment. Other factors may also help explain why we do not see differential rates 
of default between our five-week and weekly repayment clients; for example, clients 
in this experiment were veteran VFS clients who had experienced more loan cycles. 
Another reason why we do not see default results in this study may be the fact that 
treatment clients had more time between all repayments, in comparison to Field, 
Pande, Papp, and Rigol (2001) where both treatment and control clients repaid 
every two weeks and only the grace period between disbursement and first 
repayment was varied. This additional time between repayments could have 
allowed treatment clients in our study more time to deal effectively with negative 
shocks between payments and avoid default. 
 
9 Policy Implications 
 
Our findings have immediate relevance to the ongoing policy debates in the 
microfinance field. Media reports of over-indebtedness among microfinance clients 
in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh have spurred the government to take steps 
towards increased regulation of the Indian MFI sector and have sparked debates 
about the practices of MFIs more globally. The Reserve Bank of India has released a 
series of recommendations for next steps in regulation of the MFI sector and one of 
the most prominent of these recommended changes is the movement from a weekly 
to a monthly repayment schedule (Reserve Bank of India, 2011). This paper, along 
with the companion study by Field, Pande, Papp and Rigol (2011), suggests that 
client business income can be significantly raised by introducing greater flexibility 
in repayment schedules.  
 
Our study also suggests that repayment flexibility can reduce the number of hours 
secondary earners spend in income-generating activities as well as reduce clients’ 
mental stress over finances. However, this should be balanced by the potential 
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increase in default that MFIs may experience with allowing greater flexibility in loan 
repayment for clients.   
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